Chipotle does brand right

29 07 2009

In a recent post, I gave credit to MyChipotle.com for its excellent execution of a so-called “brand campaign” online. The campaign launched in May and features print, bus stop, taxi top and online spots in select cities like Chicago and Dallas which direct customers to:

StopStarving

This campaign works well for several reasons:

1. Illustration: the first thing a viewer sees actually shows the food. It’s appetizing. Looks fresh. Showing good looking food should be a basic pre-requisite for all fast food advertising. Otherwise you get the Burger King debacle from Crispin, Porter which has won plenty of awards but sold almost no burgers as sales and market share at the “The King” have dropped.

2. Headline: it’s simple and bright enough to be seen walking by the bus stop or as tax cabs pass by.  This principal should be applied to web ads which are glanced at for, at best, 1 second. Here’s an example of a terrible ad which lacks a headline, has tiny print and black reverse copy which is especially difficult for the aging eyes of the older target audience to read:

JaguarInvisible

3. Call to action: it’s actually very well executed and based upon a consumer insight. If you visit MyChipotle.com you’ll find a site which highlights all 60,000 great combinations  that you could make with Chipotle and includes some colorful user generated videos highlighting their favorite burrito recipes. It’s fun, informative and gets you thinking about trying to come up with a new flavor combo yourself. It also gives you a higher sense that being a regular at Chipotle makes you a member of a community.

This campaign is based upon a customer insight gathered from research: consumers don’t feel like Chipotle offers enough variety relative to other fast food competitors. This is despite the fact that Chipotle actually offers almost infinite flavor combinations with every dish fresh made. But most customers actually order the same thing every time.

That said, the campaign does fall short on a few dimensions:

1. Advertising-dependent: if the problem is variety and consumer boredom, Chipotle should also be looking at its product mix, menu design and service process. Perhaps it’s time to introduce a new product or sauce now and then at Chipotle? Chipotle’s menu design resembles a flow where you “pick one” from each of the wrap, meat, filling and sauces categories. But this leads some consumers to feel like a rule is being imposed upon them when it’s not: you can actually pick two meats if you like. Finally, the service process itself could adapt a bit to this. Chipotle could train its employees to prompt stumped customers with friendly suggestions.

2. Lack of follow-through in the store. There’s no tie-in between MyChipotle.com and the stores. You can’t find the nearest Chipotle from the MyChipotle.com site. Nor can you one-click order your favorite user-generated recipes by using Chipotle’s web ordering tool. And finally, no sight of the most innovative implementation which would be to stream MyChipotle.com content into the stores to be enjoyed by customers in the notoriously long lines.

The lack of foll0w-through likely results from an abundance of marketing silos within retailers. The problem is that none of these silos call themselves marketing, but they are crucial to it. The group that does service process doesn’t say that it’s engaged in marketing, but it touches the customer more than anybody else in the company. The people who design the menus and order the signs “aren’t in marketing” but consumers spend more time looking at those than any advertisement. Finally, yet another group manages “technology” and is likely waiting for its marching orders from marketing. But alas, those might not come because the general problem is these companies fail to recognize is that marketing is something that everybody in the company needs to be worried about. In other words, marketing is too important to be left only to the marketers.

That said, Chipotle and its agency Butler, Shine, Stern and Partners seem to be running great campaign which pushes down the barriers between brand and response, bricks and clicks.





Bits and pieces on OpenTable and the new CPA

3 05 2009

TechCrunch has an article up today on pre-IPO restaurant reservation platform OpenTable which is spawning lots of vociferous user comments in response to journalist Sarah Lacy’s criticism of OpenTable for not “offering a real consumer service (i.e. Yelp)” and suggesting they should use their IPO money to hire some talented UI designers.

Lacy makes a decent strawman for the naivity of some Silicon Valley pop business journalism but I won’t go there. Instead, her “call for business models” makes a good lead-in for me to discuss the subject of online-to-offline acquisition I think will, someday, be the “next big thing” which most Web 2.0 social start-ups will turn to to save their business model.The problem is that most won’t be equipped with the basic pre-requisites. I’ll speak to those in a bit.

But first, let’s look at OpenTable. I found an excellent article on OpenTable by blogger J. Bryan Scott who clearly loves technology is also also getting a proper education in finance. It contains this powerful table within it:


What’s the key metric? It costs a restaurant 69 cents per diner to book reservations on OpenTable. I think this is incredibly cheap for a CPA acquisition campaign!

OpenTable probably isn’t charging more than 20% of the value it creates for members. Aside from the paying customers you’re getting into seats, consider the benefits of free advertising to millions of users on OpenTable, having a useful IT system to supplant pencil & paper and having access to a post-purchase communications channel directly with the customer in a business where most unhappy diners just walk away and never return.

I believe that implementing an online-to-offline acquisition model will become key for many Web 2.0 start-ups struggling with limited online advertising models. The problem is that most Web 2.0 start-ups lack the pre-requisites for building the CPoA (cost-per-offline-acquisition) + Service model:

  • You need to focus from Day One on inciting action. It doesn’t matter if the site is entertaining, the question asked by customers is will it bring me customers? This is the difference between Yelp and OpenTable. Yelp is a good, but not as great as focused communities like Eater.com, source of information but it sits at the back of the purchasing food chain which runs from awareness -> interest -> choice set -> intent -> purchase -> customer service.
  • You need critical mass in a focused area. Facebook cannot replicate OpenTable’s functionality despite millions more users. The problem is more than just screenspace: there isn’t enough room in members’ minds to see Facebook as the Swiss Army knife of their world. This is why most Facebook Apps failed to get past the You’ve Been Bitted by a Zombie phase: Facebook is for child’s play in author-community investor David Silver’s well-chosen words. This is also why you see Proctor and Gamble owning so many brands of detergant and keeping Tide in the laundry room not the kitchen.
  • You need traveling salesmen who hit the streets, get meetings, attend conferences and sign up customers who will use your solution. Salespeople need lists and a well-defined target market unlike technologies. There are no easy armchair solutions like “search engine marketing” for building an online-to-offline CPA model. Illustration of this in action: Facebook made much of poaching a Google executive whom I happen to know to be “Director of Business Development” then made him “Director of Platform” 10 months later.
  • You need some clunky proprietary solution like a terminal that breaks, customers complain about and is almost certainly not elegant in its UI design. But that dumb box that’s not hooked up to the Cloud is enough for99% of real world business owners and, most importantly, it’s scarce and troublesome to distribute to 8,000 locations. In other words, there are some barriers to entry that a 22 year old programmer can’t leapfrog.

My view is that this business model is applicable to any industry with millions of potential customers, thousands of competitive retailers, product information available online and impediments to customer customer purchase intent like travel time, scarce inventory (or appointment times) and the passing of momentary impulses.

The trouble with this model is, as Lacy identifies, that you have to serve your customers. It’s just that they’re your paying customers who are a lot more difficult to please than Yelpers. That’s probably the reason why OpenTable charges so little: they’re trying to encourage adoption while ensuring that competitors don’t find the profits attractive enough to compete against them in this early stage.





Evaluating the Microsoft store strategy…

28 02 2009

I was going to write this post last week, but WordPress ate it. I haven’t posted since, and this points out a human tendency: after failure, sometimes we just want to turn the page and regain control. I think it’s plausible that this is what Microsoft’s trying to do with its stores and the strategy may be completely misguided in that way.

Let’s evaluate the fundamentals from my first post on why Microsoft might want to open a store:

Is there not enough competition in retailing?

On first glance, the loss of Circuit City, CompUSA and others suggests this. But I think the primary reason these players went bankrupt was from competition from Internet retailers: Amazon, Egghead, HP, Dell and even Microsoft direct. Overall, the demand for computer stores is lower than ever since online alternatives exist. There are, however,other types of  retailers going strong: Target, Wal-mart, Costco and Game Stop. Finding ways to help these retailers sell PCs well would be a good move towards Microsoft targeting segments which Apple ignores.

Is there too much competition? Such that retailers cannot provide adequate service?

A Catch 22  in retailing is that competition reduces prices, which is good for consumers, but also drives down margins which can, in turn, drives down service quality to a level that’s below what consumers would like. Manufacturers which desire for retailers to provide more service/promotion try to set Acceptable Price levels which lock-in a profit margin.

There is a great case that traditional retail is being out-competed by online, but is it also being out-serviced? A large percentage of customers simply prefer to buy PCs online because product information, service and configuration options are superior. This suggests to me that traditional retailers should be incorporating technology which gives customers the option to browse, configure and order PCs for home delivery from in-store locations. They need to start thinking of service as more than a guy in a blue-shirt.

Are retailers/OEMs not optimizing the presentation of Microsoft’s products or brand?

Are markets efficient? Corporate central planners often like to think not. They see competition as producing a race-to-the-bottom. If only Microsoft, Sony and Dell could “cooperate” to coordinate promotional dollars, then each would be better off.

There’s a case that cooperation can help avoid price wars and implement standards which are useful to the consumer. But this can also be abused: the promotion of Vista Capable computers is now the subject of a lawsuit alleging that Microsoft colluded with Intel and its OEMs to sell inferior computers to consumers. This coordinated effort ultimately did much to damage Vista’s reputation. If Microsoft would have kept its hands-off and let each re-seller determine how to promote Vista Capable given its limitation, it’s more likely that this product would have ended up with Vista Ultimate – unbought.  

So the argument that Microsoft ought to open stores in order to better coordinate promotion begs a question as to whether this is dangerous central planning. After all, the strength of PC platform is in its diversity. Dell has lines of PCs for home, student, office and corporate users; Staples presents information on PCs for small business users and Best Buy focuses on its segment. Microsoft lacks the “local knowledge” about consumers which can help it make decisions as well as its retailers. The result I suspect will be Microsoft stores which push a Redmond corporate line: the flavor of the week. We’ll see space devoted to Microsoft Surface, Zune and other products which consumers don’t want but Microsoft wants to push out to consumers. The result may be that the Microsoft store, much like Sony Style,  finds its niche in selling everything that nobody else wants to sell it.

Are retailers failing to sell complementary products which drive Microsoft sales, for instance Windows Mobile phones.

The argument here is that consumers have “unmet needs” for a “total solution” which Microsoft can provide. For instance, a consumer who buys a PCs will also need a printer and could benefit from the right digital camera as well. My evaluation of this is that if this is the best argument Microsoft has for opening stores, it’s living in 1995. That’s when I used to work for HP doing just that in CompUSA and Micro Center stores. Manufacturers and retailers have been busy at the cross-selling bit for some time. If Microsoft has discovered a new secret sauce, then it should be sharing it with its retailing partners rather than confining it to a few stores.

Is Microsoft advertising so saturated that stores are the final frontier?

Traditional advertising excels at helping you to buy things you never knew you really wanted. Note how much of television advertising is for soap and ketchup – things you aren’t searching for on Google. The argument goes that PCs are something that people are already very well aware of and which Microsoft’s partners like Dell already spend several billion dollars advertising.  Since we’re all familiar with what a PC does and where to buy one, advertising has limited value.

The argument thus goes that if advertising has limited value, maybe stores can help “form a relationship with the customer” or “engage the customer.” Perhaps that’s true: the Apple store’s Genius Bar is often seen as a great relationship-forming mechanism. Helping nip detractors in the bud by fixing their problems has been shown to be one of the most effective investments in customer service that companies can make.

I think this is the best argument for Microsoft stores, but it’s one that needs to be scoped according to what kind of relationship customers actually want with Microsoft. For the most part, I personally want a very limited relationship with Microsoft. The fewer error messages, the better. If I could accomplish it very quickly, I’d like to learn to publish to WordPress from Microsoft Word. But I don’t know that the Microsoft store can help me with that as well as I can help myself with a simple Google search. I also don’t want to haul one of my PCs to their store to get fixed. I’ll mail it back to Dell or Lenovo who actually have the right parts and incentives, to keep me as a future customer, to fix it. So I’m very skeptical as to whether the Microsoft store can accomplish its goals with me. Others may feel differently, but I sure hope that Microsoft has found them.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I don’t see a very strong rationale for Microsoft stores. But I acknowledge that many thought the same about Apple in its time so I can’t wait to see the counter-argument when Microshops start opening up. 





Microsoft stores, a solution in search of a problem?

17 02 2009

Microsoft has announced that it wants to open stores, and hired a Wal-mart veteran to manage them. Reacting to this, long-time Microsoft blogger Robert Scoble provided a number of suggests for “What Microsoft can learn about Retail from Apple and Best Buy.

But upon reflection, I think Scobel has thought ahead too quickly. Before getting into who Microsoft should learn from, we need to have a good answer to the question of why it wants to open stores? What’s the problem to be solved? Only then can we come up with plausible tactics and talk about the incentives necessary to achieve them.

The first thing to recognize is that Microsoft’s context is completely different than that of Best Buy or Apple:

- Best Buy is a most successful retailer. They have immense buying power: their retail sales are nearly equivalent to Microsoft’s total sales. They sell diverse products so that almost every time a customer enters the store they end up buying something. For instance, Best Buy may use a loss leader like a discounted DVD to bring a customer into the store who ends up also shopping for a new computer. Consequentially, they’re incredibly popular with customers and obtain favorable lease terms from developers who wish to have them as an anchor tenant.

- Apple is a manufacturer and a retailer, but prior to opening their own stores they had no mass retail sales channel. 53% of its sales come direct from its own stores today. The Apple marketing message is tightly controlled by the company and well executed. This allows Apple to set retail prices that build in high margins on its products, allowing for the consistently high service levels and “customer experience” that they are so famous for. Making a suite of hardware and software, Apple captures almost all of the value from any sales that it generates.

- Microsoft, in contrast to Apple, is largely a software manufacturer (its hardware business is less than 20% of sales) which depends upon an ecosystem of Original Equipment Manufacturers and Retailers to sell its products in millions of possible configurations to a very diverse audience of home and office users. Collectively, these channels advertising spending dwarfs Apple’s $500 million ad budget. For instance, Dell alone spends about $1.5 billion. Microsoft lets these OEMs and retailers compete vigorously, and that’s one reason why Microsoft products are so much more inexpensive and varied than Apple. But this is also why customer experience and service levels vary.

This very different context ought to caution Microsoft NOT take too many lessons directly from Best Buy or Apple.

The fundamental question then is, what problem is Microsoft trying to solve?

  • Is there not enough competition in retailing?
  • Is there too much competition? Such that retailers cannot provide adequate service?
  • Are retailers/OEMs not optimizing the presentation of Microsoft’s products or brand?
  • Are retailers failing to sell complementary products which drive Microsoft sales, for instance Windows Mobile phones.
  • Is Microsoft advertising so saturated that stores are the final frontier?

I’ll attempt to answer these in future blog posts but they are really important because there exist many alternative ways to address some of these questions besides opening stores. And opening stores carries with it many risks.

For instance, consider the possibility that Microsoft decides to open stores in great locations, near a Best Buy, and offer exceptional service but higher prices. Many of Best Buy’s existing customers will visit the Microsoft shop and receive fantastic customer service. Some, who appreciate good service, will purchase directly from the Microsoft shop. Others will free-ride and purchase at a lower price from Best Buy. The result in either case is that the customers who care about service are getting it from Microsoft. The result will be that Best Buy will be incentivized to actually reduce service quality. After all, the customers who shop at Best Buy now care about price almost exclusively. Thus Microsoft’s customer experience problems will have been made worse when it becomes the outsourced service arm of its retailers.